B. The Problem of Practicality in Political Science Theory

B. The Problem of Practicality in Political Science Theory

 

Does studying political science help in actual political activities or understanding political phenomena? Let me call this the 'practicality' problem of political science. Almost all political science researchers hold negative opinions about the practicality of political science. It seems that the practicality of political science does not satisfy most people interested in political science.

 

Of course, there is criticism about the practicality of economics, which is considered the best among social science fields. However, the practicality problem of political science is different in scale from that of economics. If it is reported in the media that the head of a country's economic department has not studied economics, many people would feel uneasy. In contrast, if it is reported in the media that a politician in a country has not studied political science, such a fact would not attract anyone's interest. It is not an issue at all. This shows how weak the practicality of political science is. There are at least three problems with the content of political science, which has weak practicality.

 

 

(1) Empirical Science by Philosophical Speculation

 

First, the content of existing political science can be said to have not explored actual political reality to the extent that it has been studied as an empirical science through philosophical speculation. Since the basic assumption of empirical science is that "great scientific discoveries are made by generalizing what has been observed, as if describing generally valid laws," political science should also approach empirical (i.e., actually occurring political realities) cases through generalization if it aims to be a science rather than philosophy. For example, did all political institutions emerge at once, or did some of them emerge first? Jared Diamond answers this question by saying, "We can infer the answer to this question by comparing modern societies with different levels of organization, examining records and archaeological evidence of past societies, or observing how certain social institutions change over time." A similar attitude needs to be introduced to political science research.

 

Despite this, there are very few examples in classical political theory literature that prove the content of the theory using actual political phenomena. This is a surprising but true fact. Even the works of prominent behavioral and positivist political scientists like Easton and Parsons are no exception. The main content of political theory is to compare and review the doctrines of each political theory, engaging in conceptual and philosophical discussions. In short, it is a political theory unrelated to reality. This is the case even for political research that aims to be positivist.

 

 

(2) Blind Conceptual Distinctions

 

Secondly, traditional political science has failed to properly systematize even the concepts, producing only blind conceptual distinctions. For example, Max Weber developed an authority structure theory that characterizes organizations by the internal authority relationships, distinguishing between the concepts of power and authority and classifying types of organizations according to how authority is legitimized. "He posits three pure ideal types of organizational forms: charismatic authority, traditional authority, and rational-legal authority." The intended conclusion of Max Weber's argument can be easily inferred: advocating for organizations with rational-legal authority in contrast to other authorities. In fact, Max Weber regards the type of organization with rational-legal authority and rule by law as the 'bureaucratic organizational form', describing it as "the most efficient form of organization technically possible." If physics were to explain the laws of motion in this way, it would be as follows: "Distinguish between the concepts of motion and trajectory, and classify motion systems according to how the trajectory occurs in relation to other objects. Thus, the motion system can be posited as three pure motion systems: stable, unstable, and complex. Through this, the necessity of a stable motion system can be advocated." This is closer to literature that appreciates a single experience from multiple angles, rather than a science that generalizes experience.

 

As another example, T. Skocpol distinguishes regime transitions into revolutionary transitions and evolutionary transitions. However, upon closer examination of the content, it seems that the only difference between the two is the scope and speed of the transition. In other words, there is no need to categorize them into two groups when it can be explained as a continuous quantity of the scope and speed of regime change.

 

 

(3) Pseudo-scholarly Discussions

 

Third, without a substantial conceptual framework, discussions are mainly complex and pseudo-scholarly. For example, when understanding power, it can be simply assumed that power is determined by cooperative relationships between powerful actors ^[Ch.2.8]. However, political scientists have explained this very complexly. Max Weber said, "Power means the possibility of a person or a group of people to realize their will in a social context, even in the face of resistance from others who participate in such actions." C. W. Mills believes that "a person who has seized power is in a position to make significant decisions. Whether they make any policy decisions or not is not that important; what is important is that they hold such important positions. Even if they do nothing or make no policy decisions, that in itself is a kind of action, and sometimes it has a greater impact than when they make policy decisions." Wrong saw "power as the ability of some people to create the desired and planned influence over other people." The characteristic of such political power theory is that it is not more than a written explanation of our common-sense notions about political power. It hardly advances our understanding of the changes in political power and their causes in political phenomena.