b. Factional Strife

b. Factional Strife

 

On the other hand, even though the internal situation of a political organization may appear to be a reorganizing the order for cooperation and cohesion, its essence is a war activity. This is because, fundamentally, the struggle for survival is centered on individuals, and therefore, wars between smaller political actors within the group continue. Therefore, canonical politics is merely a smooth war activity, and canonical political activity is manifested as "factional strife" and "struggle to divide sides" within the framework of law and systems.

 

This can be summarized as follows:

 

         [Ch.2.13] The essence of political activity is a factional strife. One side of it is "group building activity (increasing one's own side)" and the other side is "struggle to divide sides".

 

Let's take a look at one aspect of the struggle in canonical politics, which is the formation of groups.

 

In the late second century of Goguryeo, the king stabilized his power by reorganizing the five regions that each head of a clan was in charge of into administrative areas and absorbing the power of the head of the clan into the ruling class. In the 10th century of Goryeo, to achieve social integration, the king formed independent forces into the founding nobles and absorbed them into the royal court through marriage policies and granting of family names policy. This was the canonical political activity in the past dynasties, and it was to increase their own factions to stabilize the power system. On the other hand, in the Joseon dynasty, due to deep Confucianism, in 1518, when Hongmun-gwan proposed Confucianism, Jo Gwang-jo tried to introduce the Hyonryang-gwa and appoint a large number of Sarim (local confucian scholars), but he died as a Gimyosahwa. This is also a case (regardless of intention, but ultimately) of trying to increase one's own faction and failing politically because of being pushed by the power of another faction.

 

When it comes to modern times, Korea's first president, Lee Seung-man, was elected as the president through indirect elections in the National Assembly. However, as it was thought that it would be difficult to win the next election with a strong opposition in the National Assembly, he organized an internal negotiation group called "Communist-Democratic Party" to become the first power in the National Assembly. The subsequent process was not different from the activity of forming a group by political actors. On November 30, 1951, when President Lee Seung-man submitted a revision bill to the National Assembly to directly elect the president and to introduce a presidential nomination, serious disagreements followed and both sides formed their own political parties. Just as the US military government, which lacked a foundation in South Korea after the liberation, needed an appropriate cooperative force to achieve its policy goals, even with power, a faction is necessary for canonical politics. This is because it is the essence of canonical politics.

 

The political phenomenon that has been repeating for over a thousand years in South Korea is not due to the fact that South Korean politics was backward. When President Jefferson of the Federalist Party was elected in the United States in 1800, he reduced the number of federal government officials who were competitors of the Federalist Party and chose people who were loyal to the principles and policies of the new government, filling the federal government's positions. By the end of his second term, "in fact, reliable Federalist figures had occupied all federal government positions." Even at the end of the Obama presidency, conservatives and progressives fought over who would fill the Supreme Court seat after the death of Justice Scalia. Stalin, who was in a position to control party membership qualifications after Lenin's death, dominated all opposition in his own party and increased his own faction's power by suppressing opposition within the party. Most of the frequent coups in Thailand and the Philippines are not due to political and social structural changes, but rather to the struggles for power between factions within the ruling power. After the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, President Erdoğan immediately launched a crackdown and dismissed police, military, and other officials, and arrested opposition figures.

 

Factional strife soon manifests as struggles to divide sides. This includes the 2nd law (to be explained later) of political phenomena, and in order to strengthen and expand one's faction, he or she must distinguish it from others. Factional strife requires cohesion within the faction, which is achieved by dividing into factions. Therefore, neutral and impartial political actors who do not belong to any faction may seem desirable, but they cannot survive continuously in practical politics.

 

The situation in South Korea in 1946, where left-right conflicts were severe, is an example of the difficulty of politically existing as a centrist. At the time, journalist Ok Ki-young, who was a centrist media figure, stated in the November 1946 issue of "Sincheongji" that, "I have not yet read the 'Communist Party Declaration' carefully, but I hear the term 'communist' from right-wing acquaintances because I have not joined the right-wing party and because of the reason that I call their wrongs wrongs. Or, I am called an opportunist or even a reactionary by left-wing acquaintances, but this is also for no reason other than the fact that I have not joined the left-wing party and that I call their wrongs wrongs." This situation may seem extreme, but it is just a matter of degree. In today's mainstream politics, the neutral camp that is neither conservative nor progressive is difficult to survive in elections. Elections are institutionally factional strife, and to survive here, one must divide into factions. For example, in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the first gatekeeper, the Democratic Party, had two candidates, Hillary Clinton and Sanders. They competed against each other based on regional and political tendencies and ethnic support forces. In such a situation, could a neutral candidate who is neither this nor that survive? It is impossible.

 

On the other hand, why is it that the political organization's external activities, which are wars, often appear as "diplomacy," a nonviolent activity? The ultimate reason is the 1st law of survival, as all human beings strive for their own survival. Alvin Toffler referred to war as "low-quality power," while diplomacy and politics are considered "high-quality power," expressing this idea.

 

It's obvious that wars like World War I and II don't help the survival of those involved. Similarly, if the means of conquest or invasion is through violence, not only the conquered but also the conquerors suffer harm to their survival. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which lasted for 10 years starting in 1979, both the Soviet and pro-Soviet Afghan Communist government and the domestic Islamic resistance forces all suffered. Of course, the Islamic resistance forces, which were attacked, suffered more with 100,000 deaths and over 430,000 injuries, but the Soviet and Afghan Communist forces also suffered with 15,000 deaths and over 40,000 injuries. The Afghan land was devastated. The 1982 Falklands War between Britain and Argentina was also costly, with Britain spending 2.7 billion dollars, losing over 500 casualties, 20 fighter jets, and 30 ships, and regaining the Falkland Islands.

 

These examples are so obvious that there is no need to mention more specific examples. They are always witnessed in all cases of war.