b. The Interrelationships of Factors in Regime Change

b. The Interrelationships of Factors in Regime Change

Solving the differential equation in [Fmla.3.3.1] yields the following.

 

         [Fmla.3.3.2] \(  \begin{bmatrix}
\vec{{H_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} (t) \\
 \\
\vec{{C_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} (t) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\sum \vec{{P_m ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} (t) \\
 \\
\vec{{{C_{CH}}_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} + \vec{{S_{TB}}_g} (t)
\end{bmatrix} \)

Here,  \( \vec{{C_{CH} ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} \)   refers to the 'regime change cost', which refers to the political cost incurred by changing from the existing regime to a new one. It includes all the trial-and-error costs associated with changes in the rule system, ranging from the composition and dissemination of new rule systems to even the smallest changes in the habits of political members in the new government. Generally, the greater the difference between the existing regime  and the new regime R, the greater the regime change cost^[Ch.3.304]. However, the cost of regime change does not increase or decrease over time, so regime change cost is only affected by the difference between the old regime R and new one R*, not by the passage of time.

 

Therefore, the graph of the change in the size of  \(  \vec{{C ^{R \rightarrow R*}}}  \)(  \( = \vec{{{C_{CH}} ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} + \vec{S_{TB}} \)  ) over time is shown in [Diag.3.C.3], assuming that each vector is a scalar.

 

[Diag.3.C.3] Change in regime change cost over time

 

The 3rd law is a law that describes the phenomenon of a new political choice occurring. The condition for abandoning the existing political regime R and selecting a new political regime R* is that political harvest(gain) is greater than political cost (i.e., \( \vec{H} > \vec{C} \)  ). For example, in 18th century Russia, the agricultural serfdom system persisted longer than in Western countries because  its economic weaknesses did not surpass its advantages early on. Therefore, it can be said that the political regime changes if the following conditions are met.

         [Fmla.3.3.3]                      \( \sum \vec{{P_m ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} (t) = \vec{{{C_{CH}}_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} + \vec{{S_{TB}}_g} (t) \)

 

To make this easy to understand, (when simplified by assuming each vector as scalar) it is represented by the following [Diag.3.C.4] as a graph.

 

[Diag.3.C.4] The process where regime change force exceeds regime change cost

 

In this diagram, political regime change occurs at the time( \( t_1 \) ) when regime change force (profit) exceeds regime change cost. After a regime change, repression force disappears. For example, the 1905 Russian Bloody Sunday event led to the outbreak of the First Russian Revolution Victor Serge, Year one of the Russian Revolution and nationwide strikes, which forced the Russian government to surrender. When the government surrenders, the repression force, which is the police force, disappears. Similarly, during the Masan protests in Korea, the body of Kim Ju-yeol, a student who was shot and killed during the excessive suppression, was found floating in the sea with a tear gas grenade embedded in his head, which became the spark of the April 19 Revolution that brought down the Seungman Rhee government. With the fall of the Seungman Rhee government, the repression force that forced the political regime to be overthrown disappeared.

By the way, empirically, the profit  \( \vec{{H_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} (t) \)  resulting from regime change tends to increase as social change becomes more severe. This is because the benefits that individuals receive from the existing regime are compared with those received from a new regime, which become greater or smaller due to social changes such as technological conditions, population changes, changes in thought and religion, changes in macro-trade conditions, and changes in industrial structure. Therefore, if the unit increase (i.e., change) in an individual's political benefit is represented by \( \vec{e} \) , the following approximately holds.

         [Fmla.3.3.4]                     \( \vec{{H_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}}  \approx  n [At] \vec{e} \) 

 

Here, \( [At] \)  is a 3x3 square matrix reflecting social change and  \( \vec{e} \)   is the value of the survival capacity \( \vec{L} \)  , with each component being 1 unit. Therefore, [Fmla.3.3.4] means that as the social change rate increases, the individual political harvest varies accordingly, and as a result, the overall political harvest of society  also increases.

The approximation of [Fmla.3.3.4] is due to two reasons. Firstly, the term 'multiplication' here means adding up the politicaI wanna see where to fuck with this..l harvest (i.e., profit) changes of each individual approximately. It assumes that the unit political harvest change and the social change rate( \( [At]\vec{e} \)  ) are all the same in the right-hand side of [Fmla.3.3.4], and multiplying this by the number of individuals(n) gives the total political harvest change of the entire society. However, this may not always be true. Secondly, the right-and side of this formula does not accurately reflect the regime change \( R \rightarrow R* \)  . \( \vec{e} \)   is merely the unit survival capacity, which changes by the social change rate. However, there is no guarantee that this social change rate matches the change to the new regime R*. [Fmla.3.3.4] simply assumes this to be the case.

If we accept [Fmla.3.3.4], [Fmla.3.3.3] can be approximately replaced with the following formula.

 

         [Fmla.3.3.5]                      \( n [At] \vec{e} t  >  \vec{{{C_{CH}}_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} + \vec{{S_{TB}}_g} (t)  \)   

As shown in the mathematical model, political change is determined by the size of regime change force( \( \vec{{H_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}}  \)) and regime change cost( \(  \vec{{C_g ^{R \rightarrow R*}}} \)  ), and is not solely determined by which side has the majority or which side is more justified. As seen in the political exclusion of Southern white Americans or the failure of peasant uprisings in Russia's Yekaterina era, what is actually important is that the capacity of the forces demanding political change, whether they are a majority or a minority, must be sufficient for political change to occur^[Ch.3.315].

 

Of course, depending on changes in the rule system, the overall political profit can increase even if the profit of many political actors decreases and that of a few increases dramatically. In such cases, political profit has still increased. However, in many cases, this is not morally desirable and may decrease their ideological capacity. Nonetheless, in phenomena, as in the case of capacity and size of power, results follow suit^[Ch.1.10], and political change is no exception. The 3rd law follows the law of force.