c. ㉠ Basicity of Samjae Capacities

c. Characteristics and Interaction of Samjae Capacities

㉠ Basicity of Samjae Capacities

 

Next, let us consider the basicity of Samjae capacities^[Ch,3.102]. The fact that Samjae capacities are the basis of political power means that they are the fundamental elements that make up 'all' political power. Political actors or political subjects can be expressed as political power in all meaningful interactions, and that power can be analyzed as Samjae capacities. These three forces, namely Samjae capacities, are the foundation of political phenomena.

 

The fact that Samjae capacities are the basic elements of political power implies the following two points:

 

         ① [Fundamentality] Individual or group abilities have political influence only when they can be reduced to at least one of the Samjae capacities.

          ② [Independence] Armed capacity, economic capacity, and ideological capacity cannot be directly reduced from one capacity to another.

 

There are various efforts that political actors make to gain political power, and there can be various other forces at play. However, such efforts ultimately need to aim to acquire at least one of the Samjae capacities in order to have practical effects in political phenomena. If an ability cannot be reduced to any of the Samjae capacities, it will be meaningless in political phenomena. At the same time, the Samjae capacities, namely armed capacity, economic capacity, and ideological capacity, are independent, and each force cannot be directly reduced to another force. For example, it is never the case that economic or ideological capacity will be automatically complemented just because armed capacity is strong.

 

The basis of the Samjae capacities can be explained by three different threat theories, but on the other hand, the question of whether the Samjae capacities are really the basic element of all political influence (power) is not a matter of proof, but a matter of ①intuitive suitability and ②theoretical systematicity. That is, it is necessary to consider whether accepting the Samjae capacities as the basic element of political phenomena is plausible (suitability) and whether the acceptance of the Samjae capacities is an efficient conceptual system for constructing the entire political theory (systematicity). As mentioned several times already, since scholars and politicians have suggested the Samjae capacities, there should be no fundamental problem.

 

 

The Fundamentality of Samjae Capacities

 

The first justification for considering Samjae capacities as the Fundamentality of political power is their comprehensive nature. All types of political power are composed of the elements of Samjae capacities. This follows from the fact that the source of Samjae capacities lies in the survival process theory. If we cannot think of any other threats to life besides the three threats derived from the survival process theory, namely the threats from within and outside of the human, and from directions other than the human themselves, then we can encompass all the necessary capacities for life with the Samjae capacities required to deal with these threats. In other words, if a person has the armed capacity to be safe and sometimes force their will on others (armed capacity), has enough money to eat and live warmly and go to the hospital when necessary (economic capacity), and has a set of values that allow them to live a meaningful life (ideological capacity), what more could they want? Any further concerns would be only a part of this. Therefore, it is reasonable to think that all types of political power are composed of the elements of Samjae capacities.

 

 

Independence of Samjae Capacities

 

Secondly, the independence of Samjae capacities means that each of the Samjae capacities can function to some extent even without other Samjae capacities, and conversely, one Samjae capacity cannot be completely replaced by another Samjae capacity.

 

First of all, let us examine the point that each of the Samjae capacities can function to some extent even without other Samjae capacities.

 

Armed capacity can function without economic capacity. Economic capacity can function without ideological capacity. Ideological capacity can also function without military or economic capacity. Moreover, none of them can replace the others.

 

There are some who believe that armed capacity exerts political influence only when supported by economic capacity. However, as Paul Kennedy pointed out, "economic surplus has not always been immediately or inevitably translated into military power." Thus, economic capacity is only marginally related to armed capacity. It is arguable that, during the Korean dynasty, Jeong Jungbu, Lee Seong-gye who established the Joseon dynasty, and Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan in modern politics, had only armed capacity without being backed by economic capacity. They became wealthy only after obtaining power but were not rich before seizing power. There are few who would argue that economic capacity played an important role in the political influence of Genghis Khan, who established a vast empire unprecedented in human history. This demonstrates that armed capacity exerts political influence independently.

 

Today, there is no denying that economic capacity exerts independent influence, despite being somewhat overrated. In 1179, when Pope Alexander III officially expelled all usurers, rulers had no other options to borrow money besides them. As a result, usurers became even more valuable to local rulers. King Charles I of England in the 16th century was a believer in the divine right of kings, like his predecessor James I who had dissolved parliament, but when Charles I declared war on Spain and faced a major financial crisis, he had to convene parliament to levy taxes. Similarly, when France supported the American Revolutionary War and suffered from financial decline leading to national bankruptcy, it had no choice but to convene the Estates General to impose new taxes. The power of usurers and the parliaments of England and France all derived from the control of financial resources.

 

Ideological capacity also exerts independent political power. Although the Islamic world was conquered by the Mongols led by the Genghis Khan family, Islam developed anew in the Mongol Empire and created a new political landscape through the power of its ideological capacity, which was independent of the Mongols' armed capacity. In 1979, when Polish Pope John Paul II publicly conducted mass and other anti-regime activities under communist rule in Poland, the Polish authorities did nothing, which was due to the Pope's ideological capacity. At the micro-level, the high evaluation of a particular company's well-known restaurant is also an ideological capacity that can act independently of money or the power of violence and is subject to objectivity, reliability, and other influences.

 

 

Irreducibility of Samjae Capacities

 

Since each Samjae capacity is independent, one Samjae capacity cannot be replaced by another. This is simply repeating the proposition "the law of force does not apply between different types of actions," as mentioned earlier when discussing the law of force. Therefore, the independence of Samjae capacities can be intuitively visualized by modifying [Diag.1.나] as follows.

 

[Diag.3.A.5] Independence of Samjae Capacities

 

Montezuma I, the leader of the Aztec Empire that existed in the Mexican valley for over five centuries, dined daily at a table set with thirty rare delicacies, and had over a thousand concubines and wives due to his great power. However, having a strong power (armed capacity) does not in itself translate into economic abundance. In many cases, armed forces may secure economic resources through plunder, but if there are no targets to plunder in the vicinity, armed capacity cannot be transformed into any economic resources. This is why the medieval European nobles who exercised absolute power in their own territories were not prosperous. They were knights and soldiers who fought battles and could take whatever they wanted within their own territories, but their food was simple and their clothing was made by unskilled wives or servants. Similarly, the king of the Rwenzururu Kingdom that existed within the borders of Uganda from the 1960s to the early 1980s, despite having great power and an army of five hundred soldiers, lived a humble life, and his palace was no more than a few huts. The cases of Napoleon and Hitler invading Russia, only to suffer from hunger when they retreated and the Russians burned all the food, can also be understood as an example of the irreducibility of Samjae capacities.

 

Economic capacity also does not automatically translate into armed capacity. Examples of micro-level phenomena include debtors pushing their creditors off cliffs to avoid paying back their debts, while macro-level phenomena include the custom among European nobility in the 12th century of confiscating the wealth of prosperous Jews whenever they died. Unprotected economic assets, whether due to lack of self-defense or lack of police protection, do not become sources of strength, but rather can become seeds of disaster, subject to violence and other harms.

 

Likewise, ideological capacity does not automatically transform into military or economic capacity on its own. If spiritual and conceptual values could turn into military or economic power on their own, there would be no martyrs or impoverished scholars. However, the reality is quite apparent that this is not the case. Conversely, it is difficult to influence the spiritual realm (ideological capacity) through threats with guns or swords, or through transactions with gold. In the early 10th century, as a result of the factional competition among the Roman nobility, the reputation of the Roman popes became so bad that the dignity and spiritual authority of the pope plummeted. While armed capacity can determine the pope, who is a part of ideological capacity, it cannot create ideological capacity itself through armed capacity.