a. Explanation of Key Concepts of the 3rd Law

a. Explanation of Key Concepts of the 3rd Law

To understand the the 3rd Law, it is necessary to first understand the key concepts used by the Law. This is because the Law introduces unfamiliar and abstract concepts to explain many political phenomena in a more simplified manner.

㉠ Regime Change(Political Change)^[Ch.3.302]

 

If the force to change the political regime( \( \vec{H} \) ) is greater than the resistance force(  \( \vec{R_{ST}} \)  ) that resists the change, then regime change occurs. Regime change force varies depending on the profit equilibrium, while resistance force consists of repression force and regime change cost. The essence of political change is the replacement of the existing rule system with a new one[Ch.3.302]. This arises from political choices that arise under the condition that political gains exceed the costs of such choices^[Fmla.1.5a].

In the case of the political change of German reunification, the "regime change force" is the economic expectations and pride, as well as the political and diplomatic benefits that come with unification, resulting from the elimination of the division cost and the integration of the East and West German economies, while the "regime change cost" includes the dissolution costs resulting from reunification and the investment required to raise the economic level of the East to that of the West. The essence of the 3rd law is that reunification occurred because the gains(  \( \vec{H} \)  ) were greater than the costs(  \( \vec{C} \)  ). In contrast, the argument against the unification of North and South Korea opposes it due to the "net regime change benefit," which excludes costs and is calculated to be negative in economic terms until 2020, resulting in concerns that even South Koreans may become impoverished. However, there is a prevalent opinion that supports unification by considering not only economic benefits but also tangible and intangible values and the long- term and continuous creation of future value. In this case, since the repression force is zero, the logic is that unification should occur whenever the regime change force exceeds the costs.

Regime change occurs in actuality when the expected profits are exerted by the capacity of political actors, as the 3rd law is dependent on the law of force. The 1905 Russian Revolution was possible because the opposition to Nicholas II was of enormous scale, while the government was weak enough to be paralyzed in its basic activities. Similarly, the 1987 June Democracy Movement in South Korea was possible because the demands of the people opposing the Fifth Republic government and calling for a presidential system were very strong, and the regime's repressive force(  \( \vec{S_{TB}} \)  ) was weakened as the potential problems with the US alliance made the government hesitant to impose martial law.

Conversely, the reason why political change failed in the "Dorr Rebellion" incident in Rhode Island, USA was due to the combination of the loss suffered by the vested interests(  \( \vec{C} \)  ), the social action aiming to maintain the existing order( \( \vec{S_{TB}} \) ), and the political capacity(  \( \vec{H} \)  ) of Thomas Dorr's People's Party being inferior to the sum( \( \vec{R_{ST}} \) ) of these two factors. At the time, the Governor of Rhode Island was Samuel King, but President John Tyler intervened in Rhode Island politics on King's side, causing Dorr's political movement to decline. "However, one year later, Rhode Island ratified a new constitution and expanded suffrage," indicating that the regime change force increased as the regime duration period increased.

 

Additional factors in political change

Various factors related to the characteristics of the rule system itself can also influence political change. The regime duration period and regime flexibility are representative considerations.

All rule systems, including political regimes, persist over time [Ch.2.6a]. This duration is referred to as the regime duration period(T). For example, the regime duration periods of the Third Republic and the Fifth Republic of South Korea are approximately 10 years (1962-1972) and 7 years (1981- 1988), respectively. On a smaller scale, the regime duration period of the Roh Moo-hyun administration was 5 years.

Generally, as the regime duration period increases, the overall cost of the political society decreases because regime change cost is not incurred. Secondly, as the regime duration period increases, repression force also increases^[Ch.3.306]. This is because as the regime lasts longer, the social cost saved can be accumulated as repression force, and tradition and legitimacy of the political regime can also be strengthened. Thirdly, when the regime duration period is long, regime change force usually increases. As mentioned earlier, as time passes, social change accumulates and the profit equilibrium condition changes. Thus, the regime duration period increases both repression force and regime change force, but the rate of increase differs. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the regime duration period does not change regime change cost().

In addition, all rules have flexibility^[Ch.2.6c], which encompasses a certain degree of behavior and choice range. This flexibility of rules becomes the regime flexibility of power structure. This regime flexibility(Flx) represents the degree to which a political regime can accommodate changes in the interests relationship of reality.

If the regime flexibility is high, then the regime change force can be reduced while maintaining the efficiency of the rule system, as fluctuations within the rule system do not trigger the repression force. However, such a rule system is inherently complex, and thus maintaining a complex rule system incurs additional costs. A large part of these costs is in fact the cost of small regime changes that occur within a large regime.