c. ㉣ Those with Armed Force Obtain Power

㉣ Those with Armed Force Obtain Power

 

Based on the above discussion, if you consider the perspective of discussing state power, you can easily deduce that armed capacity is the most important capacity for establishing power and political organizations. In particular, I can state this point as follows by unpacking what the armed force basis theory^[Tab.2.1] ㉠ means:

 

         [Ch.3.114] Those who have armed capacity determine the political order and this is the direct source of power. Conversely, the lack of armed capacity directly leads to the collapse of political power.

 

In considering state power, the acquisition and maintenance of political domination depends most importantly on securing and maintaining relatively superior armed capacity. In most political phenomena, "armed capacity" generally refers to military and police forces, but other forms of capacity hold the same causal efficacy. In each macro, middle, and micro-level area, those possessing the strongest armed capacity ultimately control power and determine the political order within a given political arena. Paul Kennedy has also noted that political domination, without the support of military and armed force, becomes a precarious thing that can collapse at any time.

 

In reality, Octavian Augustus, the first emperor of the Roman Empire, focused on military governance to maintain his power, and William I (1066-1087) of England was able to rule England with the help of a superior army of Norman cavalry and impregnable walls. On the other hand, political instability occurred in Bulgaria in the 8th century during the reign of Khan Kormisos (739-756) after defeat in war, and the dynasty was replaced by the enthronement of Khan Kardam (777-802). Despite the persistent and sophisticated political system of the Joseon Dynasty, it was dismantled and buried due to the powerful armies of imperialist powers and their diplomatic attacks. Even the Democratic Party government in the late 1950s collapsed due to the inability to control the military junta that was already in turmoil under the Seungman Rhee regime. From 1932 to 1991, there were an average of one coup every 3 years and 5 months in Thailand. In Sierra Leone, which was stabilized by a private military company in late 1995, the state quickly collapsed into a lawless state with warlords after the departure of the company. Such incidents have occurred in the past, are occurring in the present, and will continue to occur in the future.

 

The statement that those with armed capacity determine the political order implies that armed capacity is the substantive source of power. In many countries, the power of the president or minister is determined through legitimate procedures, and the law or rights are perceived as the direct source of power within stable political organizations that have established laws and order. However, when King Jeongjong became the king of the Joseon Dynasty, the most important factor was the military strength of the powerful General Wang Sik-ryeom. As seen in the example of a former slave who became a ruler in the Islamic world, if there is a basis of armed force, even slaves can seize political power and become rulers. The Mamluk dynasty in Egypt (1250-1517), the Ghaznavid dynasty in Afghanistan (977-1186), and the slave dynasty in India (1206-1290) are examples of this. In 1711, the Earl of Harley was granted a monopoly on the South American region by the British government, but the area was under Spanish control, and the ban on the entry of British ships in 1718 made the Earl's monopoly meaningless. Just as the legitimate emperor of Korea during the Japanese colonial era did not have practical power, laws or rights without the support of armed force cannot create any power.

 

Since political organizations have functions and entities that are almost identical to those of military organizations^[Tab.2.2], the long-term enhancement of armed capacity leads to the development of the political community. The formation conditions of armed capacity do not depend on other capacities^[Tab.3.11], and the effect of armed capacity is immediate, and its destructive power can stop the survival of others. However, since people want to continue to survive^[Ch.2.14], armed capacity immediately changes their behavior proportionally to its size. Therefore, power is obtained by those who possess armed force. Thus, “military coups have been practically successful and continued to persist from 1956 to 2001.” Looking at the success rate of coups worldwide from the mid-1950s to 2001, the success rate of coups was 70% until 1966-1970, and the success rate did not significantly decrease in the late 1980s.

 

In modern politics, the only country (not a dynasty) that has succeeded in power succession through three generations is North Korea, and the success of the North Korean succession regime is exceptional, and this can be explained by the principle that those with armed capacity determine the political order. The most significant aspect of the regime change from Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il during the power succession in North Korea was the concentration and integration of military power under Kim Jong-il. As North Korea places great importance on coercion through armed force in its ruling system, the importance of the military has increased, and Kim Jong-il was able to establish the military as the core of his power by assuming the positions of supreme commander and first chairman of the National Defense Commission in 1992 before the death of Kim Il-sung. Such examples can always be found when examining the political history of the East and the West.

 

From a more macro perspective, understanding the subject not as an individual or group, but as a region or country, the acquisition of international political power is only possible by securing armed capacity. The reason ancient Rome was able to grow into a dominant power with strong political power was because of its military advantage, which was due to the unique terrain of Rome and Italy that provided conditions for the growth of the city-state. Bulgarians, who were originally of Turk-Mongolian origin, developed into a nation after assimilating with the Slavs in the 7th century, and were recognized as a single country when they began to partially overpower the Byzantine Empire through armed force in 681. The emergence of the European great powers in the 16th and 17th centuries was also directly related to the superiority of armed capacity. The armies of 17th century Europe were stabilized as standing armies with great precision in weapons and continued to be strong through technological and organizational innovation, making them superior in armed capacity to any other nation on the planet. As a result, the power of colonial states was eventually undermined by them.

 

Several theories, including Marxism, emphasize the importance of the economy in political power. However, empirically, economic development only provides "friendly" conditions for political changes, while economic crises only provide "unfriendly" conditions for political changes. The strong causal relationship between economic development and political change does not exist, just as democratic political changes occur when the economy has developed to a certain level. "In history, there are countries that have failed due to war, but no country has failed due to a financial crisis. They only become poorer."